Hahn and Wallsten [3] wrote that net neutrality usually means that broadband service providers charge consumers only once for Internet access, do not favor one content provider over another, and do not charge content providers for sending information over broadband lines to end users." In this paper we study the implications of being non-neutral, particularly by charging the content providers. Using game theoretic tools, we show that by adding the option for the service providers to charge the content providers, not only may the content providers and the internauts suer, but also the access provider's performance degrades.
Introduction
Network neutrality is an approach to providing network access without unfair discrimination among applications, content, nor the specic source of trac.
What is discrimination and what is fair discrimination? If there are two applications or two services or two providers that require the same network resources and one is oered better quality of service (shorter delays, higher transmission capacity, etc.) then there is a discrimination. When is a discrimination fair" 1 ?
A preferential treatment of trac is considered fair as long as the preference is left for the user 2 . Internet service providers (ISPs) may have interest in discrimination either for technological problems or for economic reasons. Trac congestion has been a central argument for the need to discriminate trac (for technological reasons) and moreover, for not practicing network neutrality, in particular to deal with high-volume peer-to-peer trac. However, many ISPs have been blocked or throttled p2p trac independently of congestion conditions.
There may be many hypothetical ways to violate the principle of network neutrality. Hahn and Wallsten wrote that network neutrality usually means that broadband service providers charge consumers only once for Internet access, do not favor one content provider over another, and do not charge content providers for sending information over broadband lines to end users." (p. 1 of [3] ) We therefore restrict our attention in this paper to the practices of these types of network neutrality.
That net neutrality acts as a disincentive for capacity expansion of their networks, is an argument recently raised by ISPs. In [1] the validity of this claim was checked. Their main conclusion is that under net neutrality the ISPs invest to reach the social optimal level, while under-or-over investing is the result when net neutrality is dropped. In this case, ISPs stand as winners, while content providers (CP) move to a worst position. Users that rely on services that have paid the ISPs for preferential treatment will be better o, while the rest of the users will have a signicantly worse service.
ISPs often justify charging content providers by their need to cover large and expensive amount of network resources. This is in particular relevant in the 3G wireless networks where huge investments were required for getting licenses for the use of radio frequencies. On the other hand, the content oered by a CP may be the most important source of the demand for Internet access; thus, the benets of the access providers are due in part to the content of the CPs. It thus seems "fair" that benets that ISP make of that demand would be shard by the CPs.
We nd this notion of fair sharing of reveneus between economic actors in the heart of cooperative game theory. In particular, the Shapley value approach for splitting reveneus is based on several axioms and the latter fairness is on of them. Many references have advocated the use of the Shapley value approach for sharing the prots between the providers, see, e.g., [5, 6] . We note however that the same reasoning used to support payments by access providers to content providers (in the context of can be used in the opposite direction. Indeed, many CPs receive third party income such as advertising revenue thanks to the user demand (eyeballs) that they create. Therefore, using a Shapley value approach would require content providers to help pay for the network access that is necessary to create this new income.
The goal of this paper is to study the impact of such side payments between providers on the utilities of all actors. More precisely, we study implications of one provider being at a dominating position so as to impose payments from the other one 3 . We examine these questions in this paper using simple game theoretic tools. We show how side payments may be harmful for all parties involved (users and providers).
Another way to favor a provider over another one is to enforce a leaderfollower relation to determine pricing actions. We show how this too can be harmful for all.
2
Basic model: three collective actors and usagebased pricing
We consider the following simple model of three actors, the internauts (users) collectively, a network access provider for the internauts, collectively called ISP1, and a content provider and its ISP, collectively called CP2.
In this section, the two providers are assumed peers; leader-follower dynamics are considered in Section 4 below. The internauts pay for service/content that requires both providers. Assume that they pay p i ≥ 0 to provider i (CP2 being i = 2 and ISP1 being i = 1) and that their demand is given by 
Collaboration
The total price that the providers can obtain if they cooperate is maximized at
The total revenue per provider is then U max i = D 2 0 /(8d). The demand is then D 0 /2.
Fair competition
If the providers do not cooperate then the utility of provider i is obtained by computing the Nash equilibrium. We get:
This gives p 1 = p 2 = D 0 /(3d). The demand is now D 0 /3, larger than in the cooperative case, and the revenue of each provider is D 2 0 /9, less than before.
Next consider the competitive model and assume we install side payments:
CP2 is requested to pay p 3 to ISP1 for transit" costs. So, the revenues of the providers are:
As the model so far is symmetric, we can in fact allow for negative value of p 3 which would model payment from the ISP1 to CP2 instead, e.g., payment for copyright, as discussed below.
Discussion of side payments
At this point we render it asymmetric by assuming that p 3 is determined by ISP1 for the case p 3 > 0, i.e. additional transit revenue from the content provider in a two sided" payment model to ISP1 [4, 7] . Then, unless D = 0 there is no optimal p 3 : as it increases, so does U 1 . Thus, at equilibrium necessarily D = 0, and the revenues of both service and content providers are 0. Hence p 1 and p 2 sum up to D 0 /d. Then by decreasing p 1 slightly, the demand will become strictly positive, so ISP1 can increase its utility by U 1 without bound by choosing p 3 suciently large. Therefore, at equilibrium p 1 = 0 and p 2 = D 0 /d. If p 2 > p 3 then by a slight decrease in p 2 , U 2 strictly increases so this is not equilibrium. We conclude that at equilibrium, p 3 ≥ p 2 . To summarize, the set of equilibria is given by {p 1 = 0, p 2 = D 0 /d and p 3 ≥ D 0 /d}.
Thus by discriminating one provider over the other and letting it charge the other provider, both providers lose. Obviously the internauts do not gain anything either, as their demand is zero!
We have considered above side payment from the CP2 to ISP1. In practice, the side payment may go in the other direction. Indeed, there is a growing literature that argues that ISP1 has to pay to CP2. This conclusion is based on cooperative game theory (and in particular on Shapley values) which stipulates that if the presence of an economic actor A in a coalition creates revenue to another actor B, then actor A ought to be paid proportionally to the benets that its presence in the coalition created. In our case, the CP2 creates a demand of users who need Internet access, and without the CP2, ISP1 would have less subscribers.
The use of Shapley value (and of a coalition game approach, rather than of a non-cooperative approach) has the advantage of achieving Pareto optimality. In particular this means that the total revenue for ISP1 and CP2 would be those computed under the cooperative approach.
Side payment to the CP2 from ISP1 may also represent payment to the copy- 3
Revenue generated by advertising
We now go back to the basic collaborative model to consider the case where the CP2 has an additional source of revenue from advertisement that amounts to p 4 D. p 4 is assumed in this paper to be a constant. The total income of the providers is
Then ∂Π ∂p = D 0 − 2pd − dp 4
Equating to zero, we obtain
The total demand is (D 0 + p 4 d)/2, and the total revenues at equilibrium are
This result does not depend on the way the revenue from the internauts is split between the providers.
3.1
The case where p 2 = 0
In particular, the previous result covers the case where p 2 = 0, i.e., the case where advertising is the only source of revenue for the content provider CP2.
INRIA
One may consider this to be the business model of the collective consisting of (i) BitTorrent permanent seeders and (ii) specialized torrent le resolvers (e.g., Pirate Bay).
Note that BitTorrent permanent seeders may be indierent to downloading to BitTorrent leecher clients (particularly during periods of time when the seeder workstations are not otherwise being used) because of at-rate pricing for network access, i.e., a at-rate based on capacity without associated usage-based costs (not even as overages).
Best response
The utilities for the network access provider ISP1 and the content provider CP2 are, respectively,
and
We rst show that for any p 2 , it is optimal for the ISP1 to choose p 1 = 0. First consider the problem of the best choice of p 1 and p 3 assuming the quantity p 1 + p 3 is constant; clearly, U 1 strictly decreases in p 1 so that a best response cannot have p 1 > 0.
Thus, if p 2 is not controlled (in particular if p 2 = 0 so that CP2's only revenue is from a third party and not directly from the users), then ISP1 would gain more by charging the CP2 than by charging the users. This is also consistent with the simple fact that ∂U 1 /∂p 3 ≥ ∂U 1 /∂p 1 .
Nash equilibrium
With p 1 = 0 and p 3 ≥ 0, the utility of ISP1 is
Thus the condition on the best response of ISP1 for a given p 2 gives p 2 = D 0 /d, i.e., the demand is zero. On the other hand, for this p 2 to be a best response for U 2 , p 3 = p 2 + p 4 . We conclude that there is a unique Nash equilibrium given by p 1 = 0, p 2 = D 0 /d, and p 3 = D 0 /d + p 4 .
Stackelberg equilibrium
Stackelberg equilibrium corresponds to another aspect of asymmetric competition, in which one competitor is a leader and the other a follower. Actions are no longer taken independently: here, rst the leader takes an action, and then the follower reacts to this action.
Let's restrict to p 3 ≥ 0. We assume that the ISP1 is the leader. Given p 1 and p 3 , U 2 is concave in p 2 . So, a necessary and sucient condition for p 2 to maximize this is
RR n°00481702 holds with equality for p 2 > 0. That is, to maximize U 2 ,
Substituting p 2 in U 1 , we obtain:
We now compute the actions that maximize the utility U 1 which is concave in (p 1 , p 3 ). We have
For p 1 > 0, (11) should hold as equality. Subtracting (11) from (12) we get p 3 ≤ −p 1 , and hence they are zero. This conclusion is in contradiction with our assumption p 1 > 0. Assume that p 1 = 0 and p 3 > 0. Then U 1 is concave in p 3 and (12) holds with equality. Hence
maximizes U 1 . Substituting in (10) we get
We conclude that if p 4 d < 3D 0 Then the Nash equilibrium is p 1 = 0, and p 3 and p 2 are given, respectively, by (13) and (14).
Since we assume here that p 2 ≥ 0, then in case p 4 d ≥ 3D 0 , we will have p 2 = 0 since this value maximizes (14).
5
Conclusions and on-going work Using a simple, parsimonious model of linearly diminishing user/consumer demand as a function of price, we studied a game between collective players, the user ISP and content provider, under a variety of scenarios including: nonneutral two-sided transit pricing, copyright payments made by the ISP, the eects of at-rate pricing, advertising revenue, cooperation, and leadership. In particular, we demonstrated under what conditions non-neutral transit pricing of content providers may result in revenue loss for all parties in play (i.e., so that at least one player opts out of the game, where all players are necessary for positive outcome).
In on-going work, we are considering issues of non-monetary value and copyright. Moreover, we are including the users as active players. Finally, we are considering the eects of content-specic (not application neutral) pricing. INRIA 
